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CaseNo.20050468-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
ERNESTO ALVEREZ, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from its decision in State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 111 P.3d 808. The Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they approached 
defendant in the parking lot and asked him some questions? 
2. Did the level of suspicion rise to probable cause when defendant attempted to 
swallow something inside his mouth in response to the officers' request that he open 
his mouth to show that he was not concealing drugs? 
3. Was it reasonable for the officers to place defendant in a wristlock and bend 
him over to prevent him from swallowing the drugs? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness, which "turns on whether that court accurately 
reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." State v. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 9,22 P.3d 1242. 
The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 111 , 
100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 
2004 UT 95,111,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE 
Summary of Proceedings 
Defendant was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2003). Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, % 6 (R. 1-2). Defendant 
moved to suppress the drugs which officers ordered him to spit out of his mouth while 
holding him in a wristlock. Id. (R. 32-33). After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion. Id. (R. 42-46). Thereafter, defendant entered a 
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conditional guilty plea to one count of unlawful possession with intent to distribute, 
reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Id. at % 7 
(R. 62-69). Defendant appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at M 7 (R. 73-74), 
8-34. 
Summary of Facts 
On June 23,2003, Officer Don Wahlin was surveilling a condominium complex in 
response to a report from a woman that drug transactions were taking place in that 
area. Id. at f 2 (R. 88:3-4,9-10). While observing the area that day, Officer Wahlin saw 
a vehicle pull into the condominium complex and park. Id. (R. 88: 3-4,10). Officer 
Wahlin had previously received a narcotics intelligence report indicating that the 
vehicle was suspected of being involved in drug deals. Id. (R. 88:4,9). Officer Wahlin 
watched defendant exit the vehicle, enter the complex, return to his car five minutes 
later, and then drive away. Id. (R. 88:4,10). Although a computer check revealed that 
the car defendant was driving was not insured, Officer Wahlin did not initiate a traffic 
stop pursuant to a police department policy. Id. (R. 88:10-12,18-19). 
Because defendant's short stay was consistent with a drug transaction and 
persons who deal drugs typically frequent the same location, Officer Wahlin, 
accompanied by Sergeant Chad Steed, returned to surveil the area the next day. Id. at % 
3 (R. 88: 4,10,12-15, 21). During their surveillance, the officers again saw defendant 
return to the complex in the same vehicle, park in the same area, exit the vehicle, and 
enter the complex. Id. (R. 88:4,21). After parking their car near the suspect vehicle, the 
officers exited their car and walked up to the suspect vehicle. Id. (R. 88: 4-5,15, 21). 
Sergeant Steed looked inside defendant's vehicle and observed a facsimile of Jesus 
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Malverde, understood in the drug culture as the patron saint of drug dealing.1 Id. at f f 
3-4 (R. 21-22). He also saw a small water bottle in the console, which he testified drug 
dealers use to swallow drugs concealed in their mouths. Id. at % 4. 
The officers then waited behind a van that was parked next to defendant's 
vehicle. Id. at % 3 (R. 5-6). Less than five minutes later, "defendant came around the 
van" whereupon the two officers approached defendant to speak with him. Id. at % 5 
(R. 88: 5-6,15,29). Officer Wahlin asked defendant whether he knew that liis vehicle 
was uninsured. Id. (R. 88: 6,15-16). After defendant asked how he knew that, Officer 
Wahlin told defendant that his vehicle was suspected of being "involved in some drug 
deal activities." Id. (R. 88:6,16). Defendant responded that he "knew nothing of that." 
Id. (R. 88:6,16). Officer Wahlin then asked defendant whether he had any drugs on his 
person, which defendant denied. Id. (R. 88: 6,16,29). 
Because those dealing drugs often transport them in balloons carried in their 
mouth, Officer Wahlin asked defendant "if he minded opening up his mouth to show 
[him] he didn't have any drugs in his mouth." Id. (R. 88:6). After asking this question, 
Officer Wahlin noticed that defendant became nervous and used his tongue to move 
objects that appeared to be "in the pit of his lip area" in an attempt to swallow them. Id. 
(R. 88: 7, 17-18, 30). Before asking the question, Officer Wahlin did not observe 
defendant chewing or see anything in his mouth. Id. (R. 88: 19). Believing that 
defendant was about to swallow drugs, the two officers immediately grabbed 
Sergeant Steed was able to recognize the image based on training and 
interviews he had conducted. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, % 4 (R. 88: 21-22). 
2
 Officer Wahlin testified that it was standard procedure to ask those suspected 
of drug dealing whether they have anything in their mouth. R. 88:18. 
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defendant in a wristlock, bent him forward to prevent him from swallowing, and told 
him to spit out what he had in his mouth. Id. (R. 88: 7-8, 30-31). Defendant spit out 
fifteen balloons containing illegal narcotics. Id. (R. 45; R. 88: 8,31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officers7 questioning of defendant about drugs did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment because the questioning occurred during the course of a consensual 
encounter. Even assuming arguendo that defendant was detained, the officers had 
reasonable suspicion to question defendant about drugs. The officers were aware of a 
report that defendant's car was involved in selling drugs and that drug sales were 
occurring in the area where defendant visited. The officers observed defendant make 
two short-term visits that were consistent with drug dealing. Moreover, a facsimile of 
the patron saint of drug dealing was observed in defendant's car. These facts 
established reasonable suspicion. 
The officers' suspicion raised to the level of probable cause when, in response to 
a request that he open his mouth, defendant became nervous and began manipulating 
objects in his mouth and begin to swallow them. The officers, based on their training 
and experience, immediately recognized that defendant was attempting to swallow 
drugs, a common practice among drug dealers. Defendant's attempt to conceal or 
destroy the contraband created an exigency justifying a warrantless search. Finally, the 
force used by the officers in grabbing defendant by the arm and bending him forward 
was reasonable. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE OFFICERS' INITIAL QUESTIONING OF DEFENDANT DID 
NOT OFFEND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
On direct appeal, the State argued that the officers' initial questioning of 
defendant constituted a voluntary encounter, not a detention as argued by defendant. 
Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 10 n.2. Because the court of appeals concluded that 
reasonable suspicion existed to justify an investigatory detention, it did not decide the 
issue but assumed for purposes of appeal that the officers' initial questioning 
constituted a detention. See Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 10 n.2. 
This Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals holding that 
reasonable suspicion existed to justify an investigatory detention. rEhe State 
nevertheless maintains that the officers' initial questioning constituted a voluntary 
encounter not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the State will first 
address the voluntary nature of the initial encounter and then the facts that in any event 
supported an investigatory stop. 
A. The Officers' Initial Questioning of Defendant Did Not Constitute a 
Detention. 
This Court has recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between police officers and the public: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an 
officer may [temporarily] seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion'' that 
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime;.. . [and] (3) an officer may 
arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been 
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committed or is being committed/' State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616,61748 (Utah 1987) 
(per curiam) (citations omitted). Defendant argues that the officers7 initial questioning of 
him constituted a detention requiring reasonable suspicion. Pet. Brf. at 10-12. 
Defendant's contention lacks merit. 
"A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a consensual 
encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive questioning by an 
officer/7 State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 34, 63 P.3d 650 (Hansen). Because "the 
encounter is consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment/7 Id. In contrast, "[a] level two 
encounter involves an investigative detention that is usually characterized as brief and 
non-intrusive.77 Id. at *f 35. A level two encounter is a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment and must therefore be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that 7/a person has been 'seized7 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 
he [or she] was not free to leave.77 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554,100 
S.Ct. 1870,1877 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).3 Under the Mendenhall test, /7a person is 
'seized7 only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of 
movement is restrained/7 Id. at 553, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. In other words, there is no 
Although only Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's opinion in what has 
become known as the Mendenhall test, the United States Supreme Court "has since 
embraced this test." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975,1979 
(1988); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991) 
(recognizing the adoption of the Mendenhall test). 
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seizure under the Fourth Amendment "until the police officer in some way demonstrably 
curtail[s] [the person's] liberty." Id. (emphasis added). The test is an objective standard 
that focuses on the conduct of the officer and the setting in which the conduct occurs. 
Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,573-74;, 108 S.Ct. 1975,1979-80 (1988). 
Circumstances suggestive of a seizure include: "the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, [and] the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Menderihall, 446 U.S. at 554, 
100 S.Ct. at 1877; accord Hansen, 2002 UT125, f 41. A seizure is likely to be found if the 
officer activates his overhead red-and-blue lights, see Hansen, 2002 UT 125, %% 37,44, 
blocks a defendant's egress, State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,1228 (Utah App. 1997), or 
demands or retains "a person's identification or other important papers," Salt Lake City 
v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, % 14,998 P.2d 274. 
A review of "all of the circumstances surrounding the incident" here reveals that 
defendant was not detained during the questioning. See Menderihall, 446 U.S. at 554,100 
S.Ct. at 1877. The evidence established that after defendant parked his car and walked 
into the condominium complex, the officers "moved [their unmarked] car up close to 
where [defendant's] vehicle was parked." R. 88:4,15,21,31. Both officers exited their 
car to await defendant's return. R. 88: 4, 15, 21, 31-32. The officers approached 
defendant's car and waited behind a van that was parked next to defendant's vehicle. 
R. 88: 5-6, 21. Less than five minutes later, defendant "came around the van," 
whereupon the officers "approached him to talk with him." R. 88: 5-6,15. 
These facts were not indicative of a seizure. The officers did not display their 
weapons, touch defendant, or use language or a tone of voice indicating that defendant 
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was required to remain and speak with them. They did not activate their overhead red-
and-blue lights, block defendant's egress, or retain defendant's identification. Although 
two uniformed officers approached defendant, nothing in the record suggests that they 
did so in a threatening or confrontational manner. They waited for him to return to his 
car, and when he did, they "start[ed] talking to him." R. 88:15. In sum, the officers' 
conduct was not marked by a use "of physical force or show of authority" such that a 
reasonable person would believe that his or her "freedom of movement [was] 
restrained." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553,100 S.Ct. at 1877. 
Defendant argues that the encounter nevertheless transformed into a seizure 
because the officers subjected him to "a series of accusatory questions that indicated he 
was suspected of being engaged in illegal activity." Pet. Brf. at 11-12. This argument 
lacks merit. 
Officer Wahlin did explain to defendant that his vehicle "had been suspected of 
be ing. . . involved in some drug dealing activities," ask him "if he had any drugs on his 
person," and ask "if he minded opening up his mouth to show [that] he didn't have any 
drugs in his mouth." R. 88: 6. Mere questioning, however, even if investigative in 
nature, does not convert an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. 
The United States Supreme Court has time and again emphasized that "even 
when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally 
ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and 
[even] request consent to search his or her luggage—as long as the police do not convey a 
message that compliance with their requests is required." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 
429, 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991) (emphasis added). That such questioning is 
investigatory is not relevant to the issue. The Supreme Court has long "endorsed" the 
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proposition that police officers can approach individuals as to whom they have no 
reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating questions." Id. at 439, 111 
S.Ct. at 2388 (emphasis added). "While most citizens [may very well] respond to a 
police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not 
to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response/7 I.N.S. v. Delgado, 
466 U.S. 210, 216,104 S.Ct. 1758,1762 (1984). 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. Delgado compels a 
conclusion here that the officers' initial encounter with defendant was consensual. In 
Delgado, agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) conducted three 
"factory surveys" in search of illegal aliens. Delgado, 466 U.S at 212,104 S.Ct. at 1760. 
With several INS agents positioned near the factory exits, other agents systematically 
questioned most, but not all, employees at their work stations. Id. The agents, who 
were armed and displayed badges, asked the employees one to three questions relating 
to their citizenship. Id. "If the employee gave a credible reply that he was a United 
States citizen, the questioning ended, and the agent moved on to another employee." 
Id. On the other hand, "[i]f the employee gave an unsatisfactory response or admitted 
that he was an alien, the employee was asked to produce his immigration papers." Id. 
at 212-13,104 S.Ct. 1760. The agents arrested those they had probable cause to believe 
were illegal aliens. Id. at 218,104 S.Ct. at 1763-64. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the employees were seized 
under the Fourth Amendment based on the stationing of the INS agents near the exits, 
the surprise element of the unannounced intrusion, the systematic questioning of the 
employees, the length of the survey, and the failure to advise employees they were free 
to leave. See id. at 217,104 S.Ct. at 1763. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. 
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at 221, 104 S.Ct. at 1765. Noting that the employees were free to move about the 
factory, and that no one was actually prevented from leaving the buildings, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the agents' conduct "should have given [the respondent 
employees] no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful 
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer." Id. at 218, 
104 S.Ct. at 1764. The Court further held that "[t]he manner in which [the respondent 
employees] were questioned, given its obvious purpose [to verify their citizenship and 
right to work], could hardly result in a reasonable fear that respondents were not free to 
continue working or to move about the factory." Id. at 220-21,104 S.Ct. at 1765. 
The questioning by INS agents in Delgado was clearly investigatory in nature and 
designed to apprehend illegal aliens. The questioning was systematically conducted by 
multiple armed INS agents with other agents stationed near the exits. Yet, the Supreme 
Court found no seizure. The circumstances in this case were far less threatening. 
Although Officer Wahlin's questions were investigative in nature, there was no show of 
authority indicating that defendant was not free to leave or otherwise go about his 
business. The officers simply approached defendant when he walked around the van 
and asked him a few questions. It cannot be said under these circumstances that the 
conduct of Officers Wahlin and Steed was "so intimidating as to demonstrate that a 
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave if he had not 
responded." Id. at 216,104 S.Ct. at 1762. 
In sum, as in Delgado, the officers' conduct here "should have given [defendant] 
no reason to believe that [he] would be detained if [he] gave truthful answers to the 
questions put to [him] or if [he] simply refused to answer." Id. at 218,104 S.Ct. at 1764. 
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And where there was no seizure, the officers were free to ask defendant questions 
absent reasonable suspicion. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. at 2386. 
B. The Officers Nevertheless Had Reasonable Suspicion To Support an 
Investigatory Detention. 
Assuming arguendo that the questioning of defendant constituted a detention, as 
the court of appeals did, the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. The 
court of appeals held that "under 'the totality of the circumstances/ [Officers] Wahlin 
and Steed had 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, warrant [ed] [the] detention' of Defendant to question him 
about the uninsured status of the vehicle and about drugs." Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, 
114 (citation omitted) (latter brackets supplied in Alverez). This holding is correct. 
"In determining whether a . . . seizure is constitutionally reasonable, [tMs Court] 
make[s] a dual inquiry: (1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at it's inception'? 
and (2) Was the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first place'?" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1131-32 
(Utah 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)). A 
detention is justified "if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminal activity "'may be afoot."'" United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 
273,122 S.Ct. 744,750 (2002) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30,88 S.Ct. 1868) (other citations 
omitted)). However, "[o]nce the purpose of the initial stop is concluded,... the person 
must be allowed to depart." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at % 31. Further detention is justified 
only if the officer "has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." 
Id. 
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Defendant acknowledges that Officer Wahlin had reasonable suspicion to detain 
him based on a computer check indicating that his vehicle was not insured. Pet. Brf. at 
14.4 He contends, however, that the officer's questions about drugs exceeded the 
permissible scope of the alleged stop. Pet. Brf. at 14-15. Where defendant concedes that 
the alleged detention was justified at its inception, the only issue is whether the officers 
had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was selling or buying drugs. See Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, at f 31 (holding that further detention is justified if officer "has probable 
cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality"). A review of the record reveals 
that they did. 
An investigatory detention may not be based on "inarticulate hunches." See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868,1880 (1968). The officer must be able to 
identify "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts," support a reasonable suspicion that "criminal activity may be afoot." 
Id. at 21, 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1880,1884; accord State v. Kohl, 2002 UT 35 ,111 , 999 P.3d 7. 
"Although an officer's reliance on a mere 'hunch' is insufficient to justify a stop, the 
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and 
it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274,122 S.Ct. at 751. Accordingly, "[a] determination that reasonable 
suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Id. at 277, 
122 S.Ct. at 753. 
Utah law makes it a class B misdemeanor for a driver to knowingly operate an 
uninsured motor vehicle on the highways of the state. Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-302 
(1998). 
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Defendant claims that the officers in this case "had no more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch that [he] was dealing drugs " Pet. Brf. at 22 
(citation and quotation omitted). This claim ignores the "specific and articulable facts" 
known to the officers at the time and the "rational inferences from those facts." See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22,88 S.Ct. at 1880. The combination of these facts, together with their 
reasonable inferences, created a reasonable suspicion that defendant was transacting in 
drugs. 
In this case, Officer Wahlin testified that he suspected defendant of dealing drugs 
based on the following facts: (1) a narcotics intelligence report indicated that the car 
defendant was driving was suspected of being involved in "dealing drugs," R. 88:3,9-
10, 30; (2) defendant drove that car into the parking lot of a condominium complex 
located at 2450 South Elizabeth Street, R. 88:3-4,10; (3) the officers had information that 
drugs were being sold "in the Elizabeth Street area of that south," R. 88:9; (4) defendant 
exited the car, entered the complex, returned five minutes later, and left, R. 88:4,10; (5) 
defendant returned to the condominiums the following day at approximately the same 
time in the same car, parking in approximately the same place, R. 88: 4, 21; (6) 
defendant again exited the car, entered the complex, and returned to his car less than 
five minutes later, R. 88: 4-5,21; (7) defendant's short-term stays at the complex were 
consistent with drug transactions, R. 88: 10;5 (8) in Officer Wahlin's experience and 
consistent with his training, drug dealers often frequent the same location at 
approximately the same time of day, R. 88:15; (9) Sgt. Steed observed in defendant's car 
5
 Officer Wahlin confirmed that defendant's short term visit was consistent with 
a "drug transaction taking place" during cross-examination. R. 88:10. Defense counsel 
never challenged that conclusion. See R. 88:10,34-37. 
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a facsimile of Jesus Malverde, which he recognized through training and interviews as 
"the patron saint of drug dealing/7 R. 88: 21-22; and (10) Sgt. Steed observed in 
defendant's car a small bottle of water, which drug traffickers often carry to swallow 
drugs they transport in their mouths, R. 347: 88: 29. 
As correctly held by the court of appeals, these facts were more than sufficient to 
support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was selling or buying drugs at the 
complex. Alverez, 2002 UT App 145, \ 14. 
Defendant contends however that the reports of drug dealing in the area and the 
car's suspected involvement in drug deals should be ignored in determining reasonable 
suspicion because the reported activity was not independently corroborated by the 
officers and the reliability of the information could not be independently assessed. Pet. 
Brf. at 17-22 (citing Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ \ 37,42 (Orme, J., dissenting)). Had this 
been the only information available to the officers, it would have indeed been 
insufficient. But it was not. 
This Court's decision in State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26,112 P.3d 507 is controlling. 
There, officers responded to the rear of an apartment complex at 3:14 a.m. after 
receiving a report that someone was screaming out for help. Id. at % 2. Upon their 
arrival, they saw Markland walking alone toward the dead end of a poorly lit street 
behind the apartments. Id. After denying that he heard any cry for help, Markland told 
the officers that he was walking home, which was some twenty blocks away. Id. at 13 . 
The officers knew the dead end road would not lead him home. Id. The officer then 
detained Markland to run a warrants check, which revealed an outstanding warrant. 
Id. at 14 . A search incident to arrest uncovered illegal drugs and paraphernalia. Id. 
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In her dissent, Chief Justice Durham argued that the uncorroborated report 
added nothing to the reasonable suspicion determination. Id. at Yl 37-41 (Durham, J., 
dissenting). But the majority disagreed, concluding that notwithstanding the lack of 
information about the report, it "was properly weighed as a factor contributing to 
reasonable suspicion." Id. at <j[ 25 n.2. The Court explained that the officer "should not 
have been expected or required to completely ignore the suspicious backdrop provided 
by the dispatch report when investigating and evaluating the additional suspicious 
circumstances . . . . " Id. The Court held that "[s]uch an integral aspect of [an] officer's 
background knowledge cannot be excised from the reasonable suspicion 
determination." It also observed that the officers did not rely on the report alone to 
justify the detention. Id. Instead, the report "served a different function: it justified the 
initiation of an investigation, not the initiation of an investigatory detention." Id. 
Likewise in this case, the report of drug activity in the area and the report that 
defendant's car was involved in drug deals cannot be ignored in determining 
reasonable suspicion. They constituted an "integral part" of Officer Wahlin's 
background knowledge and "cannot be excised from the reasonable suspicion 
determination." See id. As in Markland, each justified the initiation of an investigation— 
an investigation of the car in the one case and an investigation of the area in the other. 
And when these two reports converged at the parking lot of the apartment complex, 
Officer Wahlin's suspicion was justifiably heightened. 
With heightened suspicion, Officer Wahlin gathered additional information 
which added the necessary building blocks to form reasonable suspicion. Added to the 
converging reports, the officer observed defendant come and go within five minutes. 
Added to this, the officers observed defendant return to the same location the following 
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day at approximately the same time, enter the apartment complex, and again return 
within five minutes. Added to this, the officer knew, based on his training and 
experience, that such short term visits are consistent with drug transactions. Added to 
this, the officer knew, based on his training and experience, that drug dealers often 
return to the same location at approximately the same time. Added to this, the officer 
observed a Jesus Malverde facsimile hanging in defendant's car. Added to this, the 
officer knew, based on his training and experience, that Jesus Malverde is recognized in 
the drug culture as the "patron saint" of drug dealers. Added to this, the officer 
observed a water bottle in defendant's car. And added to this, the officer knew, based 
on his training and experience, that drug dealers often carry water bottles so they can 
readily swallow drugs concealed in their mouths if approached by police. 
While similarly timed visits, short-term stays, water bottles, and Jesus Malverde 
facsimiles may mean nothing to the ordinary citizen or legal technician, the reasonable 
suspicion analysis "allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" United States v. Arvizu, 
534 U.S. at 273,122 S.Ct. at 750-51 (emphasis added). And while none of the foregoing 
facts, standing alone, established reasonable suspicion, when added together they do. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the facts confronting Officers Wahlin and Steed 
corroborated the report that persons were selling drugs in the area, corroborated the 
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report that defendant's car was involved in drug deals, and corroborated their 
suspicion that defendant was dealing drugs.6 
In summary, the officers7 questioning of defendant did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment because it occurred during a level-one consensual encounter. Assuming 
arguendo that defendant was seized, the alleged seizure was supported by reasonable 
suspicion. 
II. 
THE OFFICERS WERE JUSTIFIED IN PLACING DEFENDANT IN A 
WRISTLOCK, BENDING HIM FORWARD, AND ORDERING HIM 
TO SPIT OUT THE DRUGS BEFORE HE COULD SWALLOW THEM7 
Defendant contends that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights 
when they placed him in a wristlock, bent him forward, and ordered him to spit out the 
drugs. Pet. Brf. at 22-39. He contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that 
the officers had probable cause to believe drugs were hidden in his mouth, Pet. Brf. at 
23-27, that exigent circumstances were present justifying a bodily search, Pet. Brf. at 27-
36, and that the force used by the officers was reasonable, Pet. Brf. at 36-39. 
Defendant's argument fails. 
6
 Defendant's reliance on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000), and 
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), is misplaced. Unlike the alleged detention 
here, the stop by the officers in J.L. was based solely on the tip of the anonymous 
informant—the officers articulated no other facts to support their suspicion. ]L., 529 
U.S. at 268,120 S.Ct. at 1377. Likewise in Case, the officers7 stop was based solely on an 
unsubstantiate dispatch report—the officers articulated no other facts to support the 
information in the report. Case, 884 P.2d at 1275,1277-79. 
7
 For ease of analysis, the State will address points II and III of defendant's brief, 
which are the last two issues raised on certiorari, under this single point. 
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In determining whether the officers' actions were reasonable in this case, the 
court of appeals applied a three-part test first articulated in State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 
556, (Utah App. 1993), reo'd on other grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) {Hodson I). 
Under that test, the State must establish three elements to demonstrate the lawfulness 
of a warrantless bodily search: "(A) 'a clear indication that evidence would be found7; 
(B) 'exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion'; and (C) 'that 
the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner/" Alverez, 
2005 UT App 145, f 16 (quoting Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 560). 
Hodson I gleaned this test from Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-72, 86 
S.Ct. 1826 (1966)). In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless blood draw for evidence of alcohol impairment was justified if (1) there 
was "a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found," id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 
1835; (2) "the officer might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an 
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, 
threatened 'the destruction of evidence/" id. (citation omitted); and (3) the method 
chosen to obtain the evidence "was a reasonable one," id. at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. The 
officers' actions here were reasonable under the Schmerber three-part test. 
A. The Officers had Probable Cause to Believe That Defendant Was 
Concealing Drugs in His Mouth 
The first prong of the test requires the State to demonstrate that "at the time of 
their warrantless search of Defendant, [the officers] had 'a clear indication that evidence 
would be found" in defendant's mouth. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \16 (citation 
omitted). Although Schmerber did not define what it meant by "clear indication," it 
discussed this element of the test in terms of probable cause. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 
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86 S.Ct. at 1835 (explaining that "the facts which established probable cause to arrest 
. . . also suggested the required relevance and likely success of a test of petitioner's 
blood for alcohol"). Based on this discussion, the court of appeals in Hodson I and 
Alverez concluded that" 'clear indication" is synonymous with probable cause. Hodson 
I, 866 P.2d at 560; Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, % 17. The State does not dispute this 
conclusion. 
In determining whether probable cause exists, this Court makes a "practical, 
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances" confronting the officers, 
"there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found 
in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238,103 S.Ct. 2317,2332 (1983). In 
other words, "probable cause does not require more than a rationally based conclusion 
of probability." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Poole, 871 
P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994). The probable cause requirement will be satisfied as long 
there exists a reasonable inference that supports a conclusion that the defendant 
probably committed the crime, even if there are equally strong inferences to the 
contrary. See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 20, 20 P.3d 300 (holding that an inference of 
legitimate behavior "does not negate the reasonable inference" of criminal conduct) 
Like reasonable suspicion, "[t]he determination of whether probable cause exists 
. . . depends upon an examination of all the information available to the searching 
officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at the time the search was made." 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088. Moreover, "[t]he validity of the probable cause determination 
is made from the objective standpoint of a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
. . . guided by his experience and training.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 
819,821 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
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As explained above, the officers here were justified initially in stopping 
defendant (though they did not) and questioning him concerning their suspicions. 
Defendant's behavior after he was asked if he would open his mouth added to the 
officers' suspicions and was sufficient, in light of the other information, to establish 
probable cause to believe he was concealing drugs in his mouth. 
After Officer Wahlin asked if he could check defendant's mouth for drugs, he 
observed what appeared to be defendant's tongue moving objects inside his mouth and 
swallowing or attempting to swallow those objects. R. 88: 7, 19, 30. Both officers 
immediately recognized this as an attempt to swallow drugs. R. 88: 7-8,17,31. Officer 
Wahlin explained that based on his training and experience, drug dealers "typically" 
package drugs in balloons and conceal them in their mouths so they can swallow them 
if they are approached by police. R. 88: 6. As recognized in Hodson I, "a reasonable 
officer would know that it is a common practice among drug dealers to swallow the 
evidence if the police arrive on the scene." Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 560. 
In addition, Officer Wahlin noticed that after asking defendant if he could check 
his mouth for drugs, he became nervous. R. 88: 18. While nervousness alone is 
insufficient to establish probable cause, "it m a y . . . be considered in conjunction with 
other relevant and objective facts." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534,541 (Utah App. 1997). 
In this case, defendant's nervousness was highly relevant because defendant did not 
become nervous until after Officer Wahlin asked if he could check his mouth for drugs. 
Defendant contends that Officer Wahlin could not have probable cause because 
he testified that during the initial questioning, he did not see anything in defendant's 
mouth or notice any mumbling. Pet. Brf. at 24. However, the fact that the officer did 
not initially observe anything in defendant's mouth, but could later discern that 
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defendant had something in his mouth and was trying to swallow it, suggests that 
defendant was hiding contraband from the outset. If it was anything other than 
contraband, defendant would have no reason to conceal it. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that "nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion/7 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,124,120 S.Ct. 673, 
676 (2000), and thus probable cause. As held in Hodson I, "'deliberately furtive actions 
and flight at the approach of.. . law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when 
coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to 
evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an 
arrest/" Hodson 1,866 P.2d at 560 (citations omitted). 
In summary, the report of drug activity involving defendant's car in the area of 
the condominium complex, defendant's pattern of short-term visits at the saime place 
and at approximately the same time, and the Jesus Malverde facsimile in his car, 
combined with defendant's nervous behavior after the questioning, and his attempt to 
swallow previously concealed objects in his mouth, established probable cause to 
believe defendant was concealing contraband in his mouth. 
Moreover, due weight must be given to the officers' subjective assessment of 
these facts, given their training and experience in detecting drug violations. See State v. 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 21,78 P.3d 590. Indeed, it is particularly telling that both officers, 
without communicating with the other, immediately recognized defendant's actions as an 
attempt to swallow contraband. See R. 88: 7,17,30 (Sgt. Steed testifying that they did 
not talk about grabbing defendant at all, but that "[i]t just happened" because he 
concluded defendant "was going to swallow drugs"). 
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B. Defendant's Attempt to Swallow the Drugs Created an Exigency 
That Justified Immediate Police Action Without a Warrant. 
Under the second prong of4:he analysis, the State must establish that the officers 
"might reasonably have believed that [they were] confronted with an emergency, in 
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the 
destruction of evidence/" Schmerber, id. at 770,86 S.Ct. at 1835 (citation omitted). This 
Court has recently recognized that exigent circumstances are "'those that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that [an immediate search]. . . was necessary to prevent 
physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law 
enforcement efforts.'" Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,118,122 P.3d 506 (quoting 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,18 (Utah App. 1993) (other quotations and citations omitted) 
In this case, the officers' immediate retrieval of the contraband was necessary to 
prevent not only the possible loss of the evidence, but also to prevent possible harm to 
defendant. Even though the officers had probable cause to believe defendant was 
carrying the drugs in balloons, they could not be sure of that fact, nor could they be 
confident that the packaging was secure. As observed in Hodson I, "[w]hen illegal 
drugs are ingested to conceal them from law enforcement, a reasonable police officer 
cannot know, for certain, the method of packaging the drug." Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 561. 
Consequently, "it is not unreasonable [for officers] to assume the drug might not be 
securely packaged so as to avoid its dissipation in the ingester's system, with resulting 
probable toxic effects." Id. 
Nor should officers be required to stand idly by as a suspect takes steps to 
conceal or destroy evidence, even if police might be able to retrieve that evidence later 
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through other means. See United States v. Holloway, 906 F.Supp. 1437,1443 (D. Kan. 
1995) (holding that "[officers [are] not required to simply wait to let nature take its 
course"). In People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624,532 (Cal. 1975), upon which defendant 
relies, see Pet. Brf. at 33-34, the California Supreme Court observed that "the mouth is 
not a sacred orifice and there is no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of 
evidence." As a result, the court concluded, "attempts to swallow evidence can be 
prevented" by police. Id. 
Defendant contends, however, that the potential loss of evidence or risk of harm 
to the swallower do not constitute exigent circumstances because the drugs could be 
retrieved after they passed through defendant's digestive system. See Pet. Brf. at 34-36. 
In support of his claim, defendant relies on State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155,1158 (Utah 
1995) (Hodson II), which reversed the Hodson 1 conclusion that the force used in that case 
to obtain the drugs was reasonable. Pet. Brf. at 32-36. The Hodson II holding upon 
which defendant relies does not, however, support his claim. 
In Hodson, Officers Smith and Garcia initiated a stop of defendant in his vehicle 
after he completed a sale of heroin to a police informant. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1156. 
As the two officers approached Hodson, they observed him throw something in his 
mouth. Id. After Hodson stopped, the officers immediately exited their vehicle, ran up 
to Hodson, "grabbed him by the cheeks, held a gun to the side of his face, and ordered 
him to 'spit it out/" Id. When he did not comply, Officer Garcia placed his gun on the 
hood of the car and pulled Hodson out of the car as Officer Smith opened the* door. Id. 
Officer Garcia placed his arm around Hodson's neck and again ordered him to spit out 
the drugs. Id. Hodson spit out some plastic heroin chips and Officer Garcia retrieved 
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additional chips by inserting his finger in Hodson's mouth. Id. Hodson's motion to 
suppress the evidence was denied. 
On appeal, the court of appeals examined the search under the three-part 
Schmerber test. Hodson II, 866 P.2d at 560. The court found both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless search. Id. at 560-61. In assessing the 
reasonableness of the force used on Hodson, the court adopted a standard that makes it 
"constitutionally reasonable for the police to place their hands on a suspect's throat to 
prevent the swallowing of evidence, as long as they do not choke him [or her], i.e., 
prevent him [or her] from breathing or obstruct the blood supply to [the] head." Id. at 
563 (quotes and citations omitted) (brackets in original). Because no testimony was 
elicited on this issue, the Court remanded to the trial court for further findings. Id. The 
court held that the officer's use of the gun, without an express threat to kill Hodson, 
was reasonable. Id. 
On certiorari, this Court reversed and ordered suppression of the evidence. 
Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1160. It did not, however, address or otherwise disturb the court 
of appeals' conclusions of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Instead, the Court 
examined the court of appeals' analysis of the third prong of the Schmerber test— 
whether the force used by the officers to retrieve the drugs was reasonable. Id. at 1156. 
In doing so, the Court applied the three-part test articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985). The Court held 
that under the Winston test, "the reasonableness of force used in a search [must] be 
measured against (1) the extent to which the procedure used may threaten the safety or 
health of the individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary 
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interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and (3) the community's interest in 
fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence/7 Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. 
Applying the three-part test, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of the 
neckhold created an "enormous risk" to the health and safety of Hodson. Id. at 1158. 
The Court held that the extent of the intrusion upon Hodson's dignitary interests in 
personal privacy and bodily integrity was 'Very high" where he was assaulted with a 
loaded weapon, dragged to the ground, was subjected to a neckhold, and had fingers 
inserted in his mouth. Id. The Court then examined the State's interest in preserving 
the evidence and whether that interest could shift the balance. Id. The Court concluded 
that the State's interest in preserving evidence did not shift the balance because nothing 
in the record suggested that the evidence could not eventually be recovered. Id. The 
Court held that "[i]n the absence of an urgent need to preserve evidence, there cannot 
be a justification for the significant risks to health and safety posed by using the kind of 
force in this case to get a suspect to spit out what is believed to be a mouthful of drugs." 
Id. In other words, the Court simply concluded that the exigency was not so great as to 
justify a use of force at this level. See id. (holding that "[n]o emergency or exigency 
justifies the use of force at [that] level to preserve evidence which would be readily (if 
inconveniently) accessible through nonviolent means"). Defendant's reliance on 
Hodson II, therefore, is misplaced. 
In summary, the potential that the contraband would either be destroyed or 
cause harm if swallowed created an exigency that justified a reasonable search. 
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C. The Method Employed by the Officers to Prevent Defendant from 
Swallowing the Drugs Was Reasonable. 
The third prong of the Schmerber test requires that the method chosen to obtain 
the evidence "was a reasonable one/' Schmerber, 384 U.S at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. As 
noted, this Court has explained that "the reasonableness of force used in a search [is] 
measured against (1) the extent to which the procedure used may threaten the safety or 
health of the individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and (3) the community's interest in 
fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. An 
examination of these factors reveals that the force used by Officers Wahlin and Steed 
was reasonable. 
In this case, each officer grabbed defendant by an arm and wrist and bent him 
forward so it was harder for him to swallow. R. 88: 8, 30-31. Officer Wahlin then 
ordered defendant to spit out the drugs. R. 88: 8, 31. Defendant contends that the 
wristlock was "very painful" and "created a substantial risk of him aspirating on 
objects in his mouth." Pet. Brf. at 37. These claims find no support in the record. No 
evidence was introduced indicating that the officers inflicted pain. And even had 
defendant suffered some pain, prong one of the Winston test considers the threat to 
safety or health, not pain. In this regard, no evidence was introduced suggesting that 
bending defendant forward created a risk that he would aspirate the contraband. This 
claim is nothing more than speculation by defendant. To the contrary, Officer Wahlin 
testified that bending defendant forward made it harder for him to swallow. R. 88: 8. 
In summary, therefore, the force used by the officers here did not threaten the safety or 
health of defendant. 
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Likewise, the intrusion on bodily integrity and dignitary interests, and the level 
of intrusion, was low. Although the officers grabbed defendant by the arm and bent 
him forward, they did not assault him with a loaded weapon, drag him to the ground, 
apply a dangerous neckhold, or physically intrude into defendant's mouth, as in 
Hodson. Indeed, the force used by Officers Wahlin and Steed is typical of any arrest. 
Finally, the officers had a legitimate interest in preventing defendant from 
swallowing the evidence to conceal or destroy it. As noted, Hodson II holds that police 
may not prevent a suspect from swallowing contraband through a use of force that 
creates a substantial risk to the health or safety of the suspect. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 
1158-59. This is so because the government's interest in securing evidence, that might 
potentially be lost, does not outweigh an individual's interest in his or her health and 
safety. The same cannot be said about the use of minimal force. Indeed, the 
government's interest in preventing defendant from swallowing evidence, to prevent a 
potential risk to defendant's health and loss of evidence, outweighs defendant 's interest 
in being held by police in a manner that is not dangerous or unduly intrusive. 
In summary, the force used by the officers in this case did not threaten 
defendant's health or safety or substantially intrude upon defendant's dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity. Moreover, the interests of the 
government in preventing a potential health risk to defendant and a potential loss of 
evidence outweighed defendant's interest in being free from reasonable restraint. 
* * * 
Where the search of defendant was supported by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, and the force used by the offices in conducting the "search" was 
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reasonable, the court of appeals correctly concluded that defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
court of appeals decision. 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
1fl Ernes to Alverez (Defendant) appea l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n of 
unlawful pos ses s ion of a c o n t r o l l e d subs tance wi th t h e i n t e n t t o 
d i s t r i b u t e . See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) ( i i i ) (2002) . We 
aff i rm. 
BACKGROUND1 
\2 On June 23, 2003, two Salt Lake City Police officers, one of 
whom was Officer Don Wahlin, were observing a condominium complex 
in Salt Lake City because, according to Wahlin, they had received 
information that drug transactions had been taking place in that 
area. While observing the condominium complex that day, Wahlin 
saw a vehicle (the vehicle) drive into the complex. Wahlin had 
1. With the exception of the facts recited concerning the 
procedural history of Defendant's case, the following facts were 
presented at the August 29, 2003 hearing on Defendant's motion to 
suppress. 
previously received information from the narcotics division of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department that the vehicle had 
possibly been involved in drug transactions. Wahlin then saw 
Defendant get out of the vehicle, enter the condominium complex, 
return to the vehicle less than five minutes later, get back into 
the vehicle, and drive the vehicle out of the complex. Based 
upon the information he had previously received and his 
observation of Defendant that day, Wahlin believed that Defendant 
had been involved in a drug transaction. Wahlin testified that 
he believed Defendant's short visit to the complex was consistent 
with short-stay drug traffic. Although Wahlin discovered that 
day that the vehicle was uninsured, he and the other officer 
chose not to initiate a traffic stop on that basis. 
f3 Wahlin testified that because it was typical for drug 
dealers to frequent the same location, he and Salt Lake City 
Police Sergeant Chad Steed decided to return to the condominium 
complex the following day to see if the vehicle would return. 
While observing the complex, Wahlin and Steed saw Defendant drive 
the vehicle into the same area of the complex as he had the 
previous day, get out of the vehicle, and enter the complex. 
Wahlin and Steed then walked to the vehicle and waited for 
Defendant to return. Wahlin and Steed waited in an empty parking 
stall adjacent to the vehicle, behind a full-size van that was 
parked in the stall adjacent to the empty stall. 
f4 While waiting, Steed looked inside the vehicle and observed 
a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde," which Steed testified he was 
able to recognize through his training, interviews he had 
conducted, and his observation of known drug houses. Steed also 
testified that, according to interviews he had conducted, "Jesus 
Malverde" was the patron saint of drug dealing. In addition, 
Steed observed a small bottle of water in the console of the 
vehicle, which he testified he had seen suspected drug dealers 
use during traffic stops to swallow drugs concealed in their 
mouths. 
f5 Less than five minutes after entering the condominium 
complex, Defendant exited the complex and approached the vehicle. 
As Defendant came around the full-size van, Wahlin and Steed, who 
were both in uniform, approached Defendant "to talk with him." 
Wahlin first asked if Defendant knew that the vehicle was 
uninsured. According to Wahlin, Defendant's response was, 
"How[ did] you know that?" Wahlin then explained to Defendant 
that the vehicle had been suspected of being involved in some 
drug transactions. According to Wahlin, Defendant denied having 
any knowledge of this information. Wahlin continued by asking 
Defendant if he had any drugs on his person, and Defendant 
responded that he did not. Wahlin also asked Defendant if he 
would open his mouth to demonstrate that he did not have any 
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drugs in his mouth. Wahlin testified that he asked this question 
because, in his experience, drug dealers usually package drugs 
like cocaine and heroin in small balloons, which they carry in 
their mouths. Wahlin also testified that drug dealers do this so 
that they are able to swallow the balloons "before law 
enforcement can get to them." Prior to asking this question, 
Wahlin did not notice anything unusual about Defendant's mouth or 
any impediments to Defendant's speech. However, after asking 
this question, Wahlin noticed that Defendant became nervous and 
was using his tongue to move objects around in his mouth. In 
addition, both Wahlin and Steed observed Defendant making 
swallowing motions. Both Wahlin and Steed testified that, at 
this point, they believed that Defendant was trying to conceal 
evidence by swallowing it. Steed further testified that he 
believed that Defendant "had balloons in his mouth" and that 
Defendant "was going to swallow drugs." Immediately, both Wahlin 
and Steed grabbed Defendant's arms, placed him in a "wrist lock," 
and bent him forward. Wahlin testified that they bent Defendant 
forward because, based on Wahlin's experience, that made it 
harder for Defendant to swallow anything that might have been in 
his mouth. Wahlin then told Defendant to spit out what he had in 
his mouth. Defendant spit out fifteen balloons containing 
illegal narcotics. Wahlin testified that the amount of time that 
passed between him asking Defendant to open his mouth and 
Defendant spitting out the balloons was approximately five to ten 
seconds. 
f6 On June 26, 2003, Defendant was charged with two counts of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) (2002). On 
August 13, 2 0 03, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained by Wahlin and Steed during their encounter with 
Defendant, arguing that their warrantless search was 
constitutionally impermissible. At the conclusion of the August 
29, 2003 evidentiary hearing on Defendant's motion to suppress, 
the trial court denied Defendant's motion. 
H7 On October 17, 2003, Defendant filed a petition for 
interlocutory review of the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. This court denied Defendant's motion in an order dated 
November 26, 2 003. On January 5, 2004, pursuant to State v. 
Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Defendant pleaded guilty 
to one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to distribute, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iii), but preserved his right to appeal the trial court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant appeals. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1f8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress. 
We review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence using a clearly 
erroneous standard. However, we review the 
trial court's conclusions of law based on 
these findings for correctness, with a 
measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to 
the facts. 
State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62
 f 1(8, 6 P. 3d 1133 (quotations and 
citations omitted). "The measure of discretion afforded varies, 
however, according to the issue being reviewed." State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1(26, 63 P. 3d 650. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that lr [w] hen a case involves the reasonableness of ai 
search and seizure, 'we afford little discretion to the district 
court because there must be state-wide standards that guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials.'1' State v. Warren, 2003 
UT 36,^12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at 1[26)\ 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court "abandon[ed] the standard 
which extended 'some deference1 to the application of law to the 
underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor 
of non[]deferential review." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,^15, 103 
P. 3d 699. Because this case involves a search and seizure, we do 
not extend any deference to the trial court in its application of 
the law to its factual findings. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
%9 Defendant first argues that Wahlin and Steed 
unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of their initial encounter 
with Defendant when Wahlin, without reasonable suspicion to do 
so, questioned Defendant about drugs. Defendant also argues that 
even if Wahlin did have reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant 
about drugs, the State failed to demonstrate the lawfulness of 
Wahlin and Steed's subsequent warrantless search of Defendant. 
We will address each argument in turn. 
I. Questioning About Drugs 
flO Defendant asserts that when Wahlin began questioning 
Defendant about the uninsured status of the vehicle, he engaged 
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Defendant in a valid, level two encounter,2 which was limited to 
the potential insurance violation. See generally Salt Lake City 
v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,fll, 998 P.2d 274 (explaining a level two 
encounter). Defendant then argues that Wahlin and Steed 
unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of this initial detention 
when Wahlin, without reasonable suspicion to do so, detained 
Defendant further to question him about drugs. We disagree with 
Defendant's argument and with his characterization of his 
detention as being initially limited to the potential insurance 
violation. 
[^11 " [Ajn officer may stop and question a person when the 
officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has 
been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State 
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) (quotations and citation 
omitted). In determining whether an officer has reasonable, 
articulable suspicion, we consider "the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the officer had specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, warrant a detention." State v. Munsen, 821 
P. 2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
1|12 In an apparent attempt to limit the scope of his encounter 
with Wahlin and Steed, Defendant has mischaracterized the 
encounter as being limited to the uninsured status of the 
vehicle. Although it is true that the first question Wahlin 
asked Defendant concerned the potential insurance violation, we 
are not persuaded that this operated to limit the encounter to 
that issue alone. In essence, Defendant has selectively divided 
Wahlin and Steed's fluid encounter with Defendant into two parts, 
arguing that the first part was a valid level two encounter and 
that the second part unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of the 
2. The parties disagree about the level of Defendant's encounter 
with Wahlin and Steed. Defendant argues that his detention was a 
level two encounter, which constitutes a seizure for purposes of 
the Fourth Amendment. See generally Salt Lake City v. Ray, 20 00 
UT App 55,^10-11, 998 P. 2d 274 (explaining the "three levels of 
constitutionally permissible encounters between law enforcement 
officers and the public"). The State, on the other hand, argues 
that Defendant's detention was a level one encounter, which does 
not constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. Because the outcome of Defendant's appeal would be the 
same regardless of our conclusion on this issue, we adopt 
Defendant's position for purposes of our analysis. However, in 
doing so, we do not express an opinion about whether Defendant's 
encounter with Wahlin and Steed actually was a level two 
encounter constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
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first. However, after reviewing the record, it is far from clear 
to us, despite Defendant's assumptions to the contrary, that 
Wahlin and Steed's sole purpose for approaching Defendant wsis to 
resolve the potential insurance violation. 
fl3 Rather, our review of the record reveals that Wahlin and 
Steed had knowledge of the following "specific and articulable 
facts" and made the following "rational inferences from those 
facts," id. (quotations and citations omitted), which warranted 
engaging Defendant in a level two encounter to ask him about: the 
potential insurance violation and about drugs. On June 23, 2003, 
Wahlin saw the vehicle enter the aforementioned condominium 
complex. The complex was located in an area where, according to 
information Wahlin had previously received, drug transactions had 
been taking place. - In addition, Wahlin had previously received 
information from the narcotics division of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department that the vehicle had possibly been involved in 
drug transactions. On that day, Wahlin saw Defendant get out of 
the vehicle, enter the complex, return to the vehicle less than 
five minutes later, get back into the vehicle, and drive the 
vehicle out of the complex, Based upon the information he had 
previously received, his observation of Defendant that day, and 
his belief that Defendant's short visit to the complex was 
consistent with short-stay drug traffic, Wahlin believed that 
Defendant had been involved in a drug transaction. Based upon 
information he gathered that day, Wahlin discovered that the 
vehicle was uninsured. The following day, based upon Wahlin's 
experience that it was typical for drug dealers to frequent the 
same location, he and Steed returned to the complex and saw 
Defendant drive the vehicle into the same area of the complex as 
he had the previous day, get out of the vehicle, and enter the 
complex. After approaching the vehicle, Steed looked inside and 
observed a facsimile of "Jesus Malverde," which Steed recognized 
to be the patron saint of drug dealing. In addition, Steed 
observed a small bottle of water in the console of the vehicle, 
which he had seen suspected drug dealers use during traffic stops 
to swallow drugs concealed in their mouths.3 
3. Defendant attempts to attack the veracity and significance of 
several of these facts individually. Defendant also correctly 
notes that the trial court accorded "little weight" to the 
facsimile of "Jesus Malverde" and the small bottle of water. 
However, our review of the record reveals that reasonable 
suspicion existed based upon the totality of the circumstances, 
not based upon an analysis of each individual fact. Further, 
Defendant's attack upon the individual facts is a tactic that has 
been criticized by the United States Supreme Court. See United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (stating that the 
(continued...) 
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fl4 Given the foregoing, it is clear that, under "the totality 
of the circumstances," Wahlin and Steed had "specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, warrant[ed] [the] detention" of Defendant to 
question him about the uninsured status of the vehicle and about 
drugs. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, we 
conclude that Wahlin had reasonable, articulable suspicion to ask 
Defendant about drugs. 
II. Validity of Warrantless Search 
[^15 Defendant also argues that even if Wahlin did have 
reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs, the State 
failed to demonstrate the lawfulness of Wahlin and Steed's 
subsequent warrantless search of Defendant. We disagree. 
[^16 In order to demonstrate the lawfulness of a warrantless, 
bodily search, the State must establish three elements: (A) "a 
clear indication that evidence would be found"; (B) "exigent 
circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily intrusion"; 
and (C) "that the method chosen was a reasonable one, performed 
in a reasonable manner." State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 560 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I) (citing Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 768-72 (1966)), rev 'd on other grounds, 907 P.2d 
1155 (Utah 1995) (Hodson II) (reversing based only upon the 
Hodson I court's conclusion on the third element--i.e., the 
reasonableness of the search procedure). 
A. Clear Indication that Evidence Would be Found 
%n To establish the first element, the State must prove that at 
the time of their warrantless search of Defendant, Wahlin and 
Steed had "a clear indication that evidence would be found." 
Hodson I, 866 P.2d at 560. "'Clear indication1 requires that 
there be probable cause to believe that evidence will be found." 
Id. (citations omitted). "In general, probable cause means a 
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(quotations and citation omitted). "The probable cause 
determination is based on the totality of the circumstances." 
Id. (quotations and citation omitted). "The validity of the 
probable cause determination is made from the objective 
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
3 . (. ..continued) 
"evaluation and rejection" of facts "in isolation from each other 
does not take into account the 'totality of the circumstances,'" 
and noting that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), "precludes this 
sort of divide-and-conquer analysis"). 
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. . . guided by his experience and training. In making that 
determination, a police officer is entitled to rely on 
information gained from other police officers." Hodson I, 866 
P.2d at 560 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
fl8 Because " [t]he probable cause determination is based on the 
totality of the circumstances," Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 
(quotations and citation omitted), we must consider the facts 
that served as the basis for Wahlin and Steed possessing 
reasonable suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs, as well as the 
following facts concerning Wahlin's questioning of Defendant 
about drugs. Wahlin asked Defendant to open his mouth to 
demonstrate that he did not have any drugs in his mouth because, 
based upon Wahlin1s experience, drug dealers usually package 
drugs like cocaine and heroin in small balloons, which they carry 
in their mouths. Wahlin indicated that, based upon his 
experience, drug dealers do this so that they are able to swallow 
the balloons "before law enforcement can get to them." After 
asking Defendant to open his mouth, Wahlin noticed that Defendant 
became nervous4 and was using his tongue to move objects around 
in his mouth. In addition, both Wahlin, and Steed observed 
Defendant making swallowing motions. Given these observations, 
Wahlin and Steed believed, based upon their experience and 
training, that Defendant was trying to conceal evidence by 
swallowing it. More specifically, Steed believed, again based 
upon his experience and training, that Defendant "had balloons in 
his mouth" and that Defendant "was going to swallow drugs." 
Kl9 In determining whether probable cause existed, we must 
consider all of the aforementioned facts from "the objective 
standpoint of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer 
. . . guided by his experience and training." Hodson I, 866 P.2d 
at 560 (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). After reviewing the record facts in this light, we 
have determined that Wahlin and Steed were justified in believing 
that there was "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime [would] be found." Yoder, 93 5 P.2d at 54 0 (quotations 
and citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that Wahlin and 
Steed had "probable cause to believe"--i.e., "a clear 
indication"--"that evidence would be found." Hodson I, 866 P.2d 
at 560 (quotations and citations omitted). 
4. "Although [Defendant's nervous or suspicious behavior is 
insufficient by itself to establish probable cause, it may . . . 
be considered in conjunction with other relevant and objective 
facts." State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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B. Exigent Circumstances 
|^20 To establish the second element, the State must demonstrate 
"exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless bodily 
intrusion." Id. Exigent circumstances exist when either (1) 
"the procurement of a warrant would have jeopardized the safety 
of the police officers or the public," or (2) "the evidence was 
likely to have been lost or destroyed." Id. at 561 (quotations 
and citations omitted). In order for the second circumstance to 
apply, "the police must have probable cause and believe that 
either contraband or evidence of a crime . . . may be lost if not 
immediately seized." State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
1J21 In arguing that exigent circumstances did not exist in this 
case, Defendant relies primarily upon Palmer, People v. 
Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1975), and Hodson II. However, 
Defendant's reliance upon these cases is misplaced. 
1(22 Defendant relies upon the Palmer court's conclusion that 
there was "no justifiable reason to believe [evidence] would be 
destroyed" by the defendant in Palmer "if he had swallowed it." 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1253 (citing Bracamonte, 540 P.2d at 631). 
Although Defendant's assertion is generally correct, he neglects 
to specifically mention that the evidence swallowed by the 
defendant in Palmer was a diamond ring. See id. at 1250-51. 
Based upon the difference between the evidence in Palmer and the 
evidence in this case, we conclude that the holding of Palmer is 
inapplicable to this case. As we will discuss below, we have 
determined that Wahlin and Steed had probable cause and believed 
that the evidence in this case, unlike the diamond ring in 
Palmer, may have been "lost if not immediately seized." Id. at 
1252 (quotations and citation omitted) . 
1(23 Defendant also relies upon the reasoning and holding of 
Bracamonte. In Bracamonte, the officers observed the defendant 
place balloons in her mouth and swallow them. See 54 0 P.2d at 
626. In holding that the balloons should not have been received 
in evidence by the trial court, see id. at 631, the Bracamonte 
court noted that evidence such as that swallowed by the defendant 
"may pass completely through the digestive tract, by the ordinary 
processes of nature, without causing any ill effects. The rubber 
container would effectively prevent the contents from being 
absorbed into the system." Id. Unlike the officers in 
Bracamonte, Wahlin and Steed did not observe Defendant place any 
objects in his mouth or have any knowledge of how any objects in 
his mouth were packaged. Although Wahlin testified that, based 
upon his experience, drug dealers typically package drugs in 
small balloons for transport in their mouths, he and Steed did 
not know conclusively what was in Defendant's mouth or how any 
objects in Defendant's mouth were packaged. For this reason, we 
decline to adopt the reasoning and holding of Bracamonte in this 
case. 
f24 Finally, Defendant relies upon Hodson II. Although it is 
true that the Hodson II court overruled this court's decision in 
Hodson I, it did so on only one issue and it did not upset this 
court's ruling on exigent circumstances. See State v. Hodson, 
866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Hodson I) , rev'd on other 
grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995) (Hodson II) (reversing based 
only upon the Hodson I court's conclusion on the third element--
i.e., the reasonableness of the search procedure). Therefore, 
the Hodson II court's decision is not directly applicable to the 
exigent circumstances element, and this court's conclusion on 
exigent circumstances in Hodson I is still valid. Accordingly, 
we apply Hodson I in analyzing Defendant's argument. 
^25 In Hodson I, this court stated: 
When illegal drugs are ingested to conceal 
them from law enforcement, a reasonable 
police officer cannot know, for certain, the 
method of packaging the drug. As a result, 
it is not unreasonable to assume the drug 
might not be securely packaged so as to avoid 
its dissipation in the ingester's system, 
with resulting probable toxic effects. 
Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertion, 
it is precisely because the police did not 
know how the heroin was packaged that exigent 
circumstances justified a warrantless search 
and seizure. The exigencies in this case 
included both possible destruction of 
evidence and potential harm to defendant. 
866 P.2d at 561. 
%2S We agree with the reasoning and holding of the Hodson I 
court.5 In this case, although Wahlin and Steed may have 
5. Holdings from other jurisdictions are consistent with this 
court's holding on exigent circumstances in Hodson I. See, e.g. , 
State v. Holton, 975 P.2d 789, 790, 792-93 (Idaho 1999) (holding 
that exigent circumstances existed when one officer asked the 
defendant to open his mouth, the defendant began chewing and 
attempting to swallow something that was in his mouth (later 
discovered to be a small plastic bag of methamphetamine), the 
(continued...) 
believed that the objects in Defendant's mouth were drugs that 
were securely packaged in balloons, they could not "know, for 
certain, the method of packaging the drug." Id. In accordance 
with Hodson I, because they did not know how the drugs were 
packaged, exigent circumstances existed in this case. See id. 
Put another way, because we conclude that Wahlin and Steed had 
"probable cause and believe [d] that either contraband or evidence 
of a crime . . . may [have been] lost if not immediately seized," 
Palmer, 803 P.2d at 1252 (second alteration in original) 
5 . ( . ..continued) 
defendant refused to disgorge the object, and one officer saw 
something that looked like a piece of plastic in defendant's 
mouth while he was chewing, because " [t]he officers acted on a 
reasonable belief that [the defendant] was attempting to destroy 
the evidence" and there was a risk that the defendant could 
"asphyxiate on the plastic bag or suffer from a massive overdose 
of methamphetamine"); State v. Harris, 505 N.W.2d 724, 727, 732 
(Neb. 1993) (holding that exigent circumstances existed when the 
officer noticed that the defendant was chewing on something and 
the defendant refused to disgorge the object, because the officer 
"had no way of knowing whether the suspected narcotic in [the 
defendant's] mouth could be retrieved later or whether it would 
be destroyed when [the defendant] ingested it" and the 
defendant's "health and physical safety could have been 
endangered had the police officers allowed [the defendant] to 
swallow the suspected narcotic"); State v. Lomack, 545 N.W.2d 
455, 459, 463 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that exigent 
circumstances existed when one officer saw a small plastic bag in 
the defendant's mouth and the defendant refused to disgorge it, 
because "there [was] nothing to show that the officers could have 
determined, when making their split-second decision, how 
effectively the substance was packaged or whether [the defendant] 
could have bitten through the packaging" and "[b]ecause of the 
possibility that the evidence in [the defendant]'s mouth could 
have been destroyed or that [the defendant] could have injured 
himself by ingesting the cocaine"); State v. Tallin, 676 P.2d 
504, 505-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting the defendant's 
argument that was based upon People v. Bracamonte, 540 P.2d 624 
(Cal. 1975), and holding that exigent circumstances existed when 
the officer saw the defendant make swallowing motions, the 
officer saw balloons in the defendant's mouth, and the defendant 
initially refused to disgorge the balloons, because it was 
"possible that the evidence would not have passed through [the 
defendant's] digestive system," "[u]nder the circumstances the 
possibility that the evidence could have been destroyed justified 
the officers in 'seizing' the balloons," and " [i]t was as likely 
that the evidence would have been destroyed as that it would have 
been recovered"). 
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(quotations and citation omitted), "exigent circumstances . . . 
justified the warrantless bodily intrusion." Hodson I, 866 P.2d 
at 560. 
C. Reasonable Method Performed in a Reasonable Manner 
f27 To establish the third element, the State must demonstrate 
that the search procedure employed by Wahlin and Steed "was a 
reasonable one, performed in a reasonable manner." Id. To 
determine whether a search procedure was reasonable, we must 
measure it against three factors: "(1) the extent to which the 
procedure used may threaten the safety or health of the 
individual, (2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual's 
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, and 
(3) the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining 
guilt or innocence." Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157 (citing Winston 
v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985)). The first two factors 
represent Defendant's individual interests and are weighed 
against the third factor, which represents the State's interest. 
See Winston 470 U.S. at 762 (outlining the first two factors and 
stating that the third factor is "[w]eighed against these 
individual interests"); Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1158 (determining 
that "the weight of the risk and the intrusion under the first 
two [factors] . . . was considerable, and the critical 
determination is whether the third factor . . . can shift the 
balance"). 
[^2 8 First, we must determine the extent to which the procedure 
used by Wahlin and Steed "threaten [ed] the safety or health of" 
Defendant. Hodson II, 907 P.2d at 1157. According to the 
record, Wahlin and Steed placed Defendant in a "wrist lock" that 
lasted approximately five to ten seconds. Even if Defendant is 
correct in his assertion that the "wrist lock" was "extremely 
painful," any pain inflicted was very brief in nature. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the procedure used by Wahlin and 
Steed created little or no threat to Defendant's safety or 
health. Cf. id. at 115 8 (holding that risk to safety and health 
was "considerable" when the defendant was "threatened with a 
firearm, . . . dragged from his vehicle, thrown to the ground, 
and ordered to spit out what was in his mouth by an officer whose 
arm was around his neck"). 
1[2 9 Second, we must determine the extent to which the procedure 
used by Wahlin and Steed intruded upon Defendant's "dignitary 
interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity." Id. at 
1157. According to the record, the only physical contact that 
Wahlin and Steed had with Defendant was the "wrist lock." Given 
its brief nature and limited physical contact, we conclude that 
the "wrist lock" presented an extremely low level of intrusion 
upon Defendant's interests in personal privacy and bodily 
integrity. Cf. id. at 1158 (holding that intrusion was high 
where the defendant "was assaulted with a loaded weapon, dragged 
to the ground, had some degree of force applied to his throat, 
and had fingers inserted in his mouth without his consent or 
cooperation"). 
f30 Finally, we must examine the State's "interest in fairly and 
accurately determining guilt or innocence." Id. at 1157. In 
other words, we must determine "the need to preserve evidence of 
criminal behavior." Id. at 1158. Defendant argues that the 
Hodson II court's holding is directly applicable to this factor. 
We disagree. 
f31 The Hodson II court held that "[i]n the absence of an urgent 
need to preserve evidence, there cannot be a justification for 
the significant risks to health and safety posed by using the 
kind of force in this case to get a suspect to spit out what is 
believed to be a mouthful of drugs." Id. (emphasis added). The 
Hodson II court also stated that "[n]o emergency or exigency 
justifies the use of force at this level to preserve evidence 
which would be readily (if inconveniently) accessible through 
nonviolent means." Id. (emphasis added). In his argument, 
Defendant neglects to mention the emphasized portions of these 
statements from Hodson II, which, in our view, limit its holding 
to the type of extreme force used by the officers in that case. 
See id. Further, contrary to Defendant's argument, Hodson II 
does not operate to diminish the State's "need to preserve 
evidence of criminal behavior," id., in every case where officers 
suspect that a defendant is about to swallow or has swallowed 
drugs. Rather, it specifically holds that this State interest-
represented by the third factor--is outweighed by the 
individual's interests--represented by the first two factors--
when a defendant is about to swallow or has swallowed drugs and 
the officers employ the extreme levels of force described in 
Hodson II. See id. 
5132 Considering the force used by Wahlin and Steed in this case, 
we conclude that the State's "interest in fairly and accurately 
determining guilt or innocence," id. at 1157, in this case 
clearly outweighs the extremely low threat to Defendant's safety 
or health and the negligible intrusion upon Defendant's interests 
in personal privacy and bodily integrity. See id. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the search procedure used by Wahlin and Steed 
was reasonable. 
f33 Because the State has demonstrated the three required 
elements, see State v. Hodson, 866 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993) (Hodson I), rev'd on other grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 
1995) (Hodson II) , we conclude that Wahlin and Steed's 
warrantless search of Defendant was lawful. 
CONCLUSION 
f34 We conclude that Wahlin had reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to ask Defendant about drugs. We also conclude that 
Wahlin and Steed's warrantless search of Defendant was lawful. 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's 
motiaa-t-o-vsuppress. 
JameS/Z/ Davis, Ji 
1(3 5 I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
O^&u^ 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
1(3 6 I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that 
the police officers in this case had the required reasonable, 
articulable suspicion to question Alverez about drugs after 
approaching him in the context of a level two encounter.1 It 
follows that I cannot agree the ensuing search of Alverez's 
person was constitutional. I would reverse the trial court's 
denial of Alverez's motion to suppress and remand with 
instructions to grant the motion. 
f^37 The majority concludes that the officers had the required 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Alverez had engaged, was 
engaging, or was about to engage in criminal activity to warrant 
1. "While the required level of suspicion is lower than the 
standard required for probable cause . . . the same totality of 
facts and circumstances approach is used to determine if there 
are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' to support 
reasonable suspicion." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). "[T]he State bears the 
initial burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for 
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a[ level twc] 
investigative stop." Id. 
i A 
Alverez's detention to question him about drugs. See State v. 
Pena, 869 P,2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). Under the majority's view, 
the articulable factual basis the officers had for suspecting 
that Alverez was involved in illegal drug-related activity is 
supported mainly by two pieces of information that originated 
from sources outside of the officers' own observations.2 First, 
the officers had "information" that drug transactions had been 
taking place at the condominium complex where they had observed 
Alverez, two days in a row, make brief visits to the same area of 
the complex. Second, the officers had "information" that 
Alverez's vehicle had possibly been involved in drug 
transactions. However, because the "information" upon which the 
officers based their suspicions originated outside of the 
officers1 own observations, and because the State failed to 
develop any articulable factual basis substantiating this 
"information," the information does not provide a legally 
cognizable factual basis for the officers' suspicions about 
Alverez. Thus, on the record before us, the officers were simply 
not justified in stopping and questioning him about drugs. 
*[3 8 While "[a]n investigative stop may survive the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures if 
performed by an officer who objectively relies on information, 
bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement 
sources," it is also well settled that "the legality of a stop 
based on information imparted by another will depend on the 
sufficiency of the articulable facts known to the individual 
originating the information . . . [that is] received and acted 
upon by the investigating officer." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 
1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis in original). See also 
State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,^13-15, 9 " p- 2 d 7 (concluding State 
produced adequate evidence to show police dispatch was based on 
sufficient articulable facts to justify stop); State v. Bruce, 
779 P.2d 646, 650-51 (Utah 1989) (allowing for "reliance on a 
bulletin issued by other police officers" when bulletin "was 
issued by officers possessing 'a reasonable suspicion justifying 
a stop'"); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141-42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (in considering whether information outside of officer's 
own observations forms part of factual basis to support vehicle 
2. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances presented by 
this case, the majority opinion appropriately acknowledges that 
several of the circumstances relied on by the officers as giving 
rise to their suspicions about Alverez were properly given little 
weight by the trial court. For example, the trial court accorded 
little weight to the facsimile of Jesus Malverde, "The Narco 
Saint," which the officers observed in Alverez's vehicle, as well 
as the bottle of water they observed in the vehicle's console. 
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stop, court analyzed "both the content of the information and its 
reliability"). 
^39 In Case, an officer received a dispatch call directincf him 
to a specific area to investigate a possible car prowl or car 
burglary. See 884 P.2d at 1275. The dispatcher described the 
suspect as a male in a white tee shirt, possibly Hispanic, with a 
"chunky" build. Id. Based on that information, the officer 
stopped a vehicle leaving the area that was carrying a passenger 
that appeared to fit the description. See id. During the course 
of the officer's stop, he detected an odor of alcohol on the 
breath of the vehicle's driver, whom he subsequently arrested for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol. See id. The 
driver claimed that the officer, acting on the radio dispatch, 
lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop his car and that any 
evidence obtained during the stop was illegal. See id. The 
trial court denied the driver's motion to suppress the evidence, 
but this court reversed the denial of the driver's motion. See 
id. at 1278. Because the State failed to establish any 
reasonable, articulable suspicion underlying the issuance of the 
bulletin, no such suspicion supported making the stop. See id. 
One was left to speculate as to the source of, or the reason for, 
the dispatcher's instruction to the investigating officer. See 
id. In Case, this court held that "[m]erely providing 
descriptive information to an officer about whom to stop, by 
itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no 
articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop was to be 
made." Id. (emphasis in original). 
f40 Much like the situation in Case, the officers in this 
instance may or may not have been justified in relying on their 
"information," depending on its basis. Unfortunately, the State 
wholly failed to detail what the information was and how these 
officers came to receive it. See id. at 1276. Thus, the State 
failed to establish that the information about the condominium 
complex and about Alverez' s vehicles was based on reliable 
articulable facts. At the suppression hearing, the State was 
required to outline the factual basis known to the individual or 
entity that originated the "information" about the condominium 
complex and Alverez's vehicle, and it was required to show that 
some legally articulable suspicion prompted the transmittal of 
the information in the first place. See id. at 1277-78 n.5 
(stating that "the State becomes obligated, albeit after the 
fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted the issuance of the flyer or dispatch in the first 
place"). The State simply failed in its burden at the 
suppression hearing in this case. 
f41 Reasonable suspicion cannot be justified by an officer's 
reliance on some sort of amorphous, unexplained "information" 
i 6 
received from some other, undisclosed source. Therefore, in a 
situation like the instant one, the "reasonable suspicion" 
inquiry is one step removed from the typical inquiry that focuses 
on the articulable factual basis behind a police officer's own 
observations and inferences that give rise to his suspicions of 
illegal activity. Instead, the focus is on the articulable 
factual basis behind the "information" that an officer receives 
from another source if it is to provide the legal basis for 
reasonable suspicion about an individual. 
[^42 The officers in this case began their initial observation of 
the condominium complex solely because of the unexplained 
"information" they had about drug transactions taking place in 
that area. Likewise, they only took an interest in Alverez 
because of the "information" they had that his vehicle had 
possibly been involved in drug transactions.3 In fact, after 
asking Alverez if he knew his vehicle was uninsured, the very 
next thing the officer said to him was that his vehicle was 
suspected of being involved in drug transactions. Then, the 
officers asked Alverez if he was carrying any drugs and if they 
could look in his mouth. Without the "information" tying Alverez 
to illegal drug transactions, the remaining circumstances the 
officers relied on to justify questioning Alverez about his 
involvement in drug trafficking, as well as to justify the 
3 . The pivotal role of the underlying factual basis for the 
mysterious information can easily be understood with a couple of 
examples. If the "information" was a radio report from a 
narcotics officer who had been working undercover, and who had 
participated in controlled buys at the condominium complex and 
from a person who had retrieved the drugs from the vehicle 
Alverez was driving, there would be a sound basis for the 
information, and the suspicions of the officers who confronted 
Alverez would be deemed warranted. Just the opposite is true if 
the "information" was (1) a report from one of the officers1 
wives that she had golfed with a friend whose husband used to 
work as a realtor and he had always said there was "a lot of 
hanky-panky in the condos and apartments south of 21st South" and 
(2) an admonition from the shift sergeant that "Hispanic men 
driving around with a water bottle in the console is gonna mean 
drugs 90% of the time." The problem, then, is a failure of proof 
by the State at the suppression hearing. Not all "information" 
passed along to police officers is of equal validity. The State 
had the burden to explain what this "information" was and where 
it came from. Whether or not it constituted a reasonable, 
articulable basis for suspicion is simply not known in the 
absence of such proof. 
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subsequent warrantless search of Alverez' s mouth, wholly fci.il to 
provide an articulable factual basis for the officers' actions.4 
f43 The only circumstances left to justify any encounter between 
Alverez and the officers was the officers' knowledge that 
Alverez's vehicle was uninsured, the officers' observations of 
the picture of Jesus Malverde and the water bottle in Alverezfs 
vehicle, Alverez's two visits to the complex, and Alverez's 
nervous behavior when confronted by police. Such circumstances, 
however, do not give the officers the required reasonable 
suspicion to detain Alverez and question him about drugs. 
^ OrmeTJudge 
4. Without the "information" about Alverez's vehicle or the 
condominium complex, his two repeat visits to the same complex 
are relatively innocuous. A dutiful nephew with a limited lunch 
break might make a brief, daily visit to his invalid aunt's 
condominium, just to check in on her. That visit by itself would 
not justify the reasonable suspicion that he is involved in some 
type of criminal activity at the condominium complex. 
Nevertheless, if the same type of brief visit to a condominium 
complex was coupled with reliable information that the targeted 
individual is a known drug dealer and that the complex is a drug 
haven, it might more appropriately give rise to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. The key inquiry in this context, 
however, would be about the articulable, factual basis behind the 
"information" that he is a drug dealer and that the condominium 
complex is a drug haven. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ERNESTO ALVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 031904214 
Judge Paul G. Maughn 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and 
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on August 26, 2003. The Honorable Paul G. 
Maughn presided. The Defendant was present and represented by Steve Shapiro. Kimberly 
McKimion, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County, represented the State. Based upon the 
memorandums of law submitted and the arguments of counsel presented, and for good cause shown, 
the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT M 
1. On June 24, 2003, Sergeant Chad Steed and Officer Wahlin of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department observed a vehicle under suspicion for illegal activities pulling into a j ^M*^ 
far ^AH^Cf^^ G^ ^ ^%^f 
apartment complex at 2430 S. Elizabeth Street. The officers watched the defendant enter ^ c M * 
the complex, and then return shortly after. 
2. On the initial approach to the defendant's vehicle, Sergeant Steed observed in the center 
console of the defendant's vehicle a bottle of water as well as a facsimile of "Jesus 
Malverde." 
3. When the defendant returned to his vehicle Officer Wahlin talked to the defendant 
During the course of the conversation, Officer Wahlin asked the defendant if he had 
drugs in his mouth. At that point the defendant made swallowing motions with his 
mouth. Both officers simultaneously watched as the defendant moved objects in his 
mouth and tried to swallow. Officers then each physically grabbed one of the 
defendant's arms and forced him to spit out the balloons containing illegal narcotics. 
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the totality of the circumstances, the Officers acted reasonably. 
2. The defendant did not open his mouth and officers clearly observed a crime being 
committed in their immediate presence. 
3. Given the circumstances, a search warrant was not needed. 
4. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied. 
DATED this J day of j^^J 2^/. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KIMBERLYMCKINNON, 8826 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
'5ffiWBrB*W 
nlr<3 Judicial District 
OCT I j 2003 
SALT! 
FN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
ERNESTO ALVAREZ, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 031904214 
Judge Paul G. MaughaV 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Illegally Obtained Evidence is Denied. 
DATED this /day of &£_ ^ 2 ? E J 2 
BY THE COURT: 
